MacArthur's Memorandum

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

General MacArthur's Views about Formosa

14 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Formosa
The following summarizes General MacArthur's views about Formosa:

It would be fatal to our littoral island defense for Formosa to fall into predatory hands. It can be denied to the Communists with very little effort.

Formosa remains legally a part of Japan until a treaty of peace. At Potsdam it was agreed that Japanese areas other than the four main islands should be assigned respectively to certain of the Allied for control until a treaty could be made. Under this plan Formosa was assigned to China. While it was understood generally, although not written in the agreement, that such assignment -- like others -- was made in the expectation that it would be in accordance with future ownership, until there is a treaty of peace the Nationalist Government of China is merely a custodian representing the Allies. As such custodian, it has certain obligations. If Formosa is threatened, it is the duty of the Allied to defend it. Such a defense could be made without the necessity of committing U.S. troops, merely by a declaration under the Potsdam Agreement that the U.S. would treat any attempt to invade Formosa as an act of war, and similarly that it would be treated as an act of war for the Nationalist Government itself to use Formosa as a base to launch an attack against China.

We could contend in the peace negotiations that conditions have so changed since the Yalta Agreement that it would not be obligatory to give Formosa to the Nationalist Government of China, but that it should be set up as an independent self-governing nation. Formosans are now neither truly Japanese nor Chinese but a distinct race of their own.

If necessary a large part of the $75,000,000 recently appropriated to be used in connection with Chinese matters should be employed for the protection of Formosa.

It would be fatal to split the U.S. line of littoral bases by letting the Communists put an air force on Formosa thereby threatening both Clark Field in the Philippines and our fields on Okinawa. However, placing U.S. Forces on Formosa is not favored.

(Signed) Tracy S. Voorhees

TRACY S. VOORHEES

Under Secretary of the Army

original document: General MacArthur's Views about Formosa

REFERENCE
MacArthur Memorial
Museum and Research Center
MacArthur Square,
Norfolk, Virginia 23510

14 December 1949
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Louis A. Johnson

President Harry Truman & General Douglas MacArthur

Commentary & Analysis

General MacArthur was well aware that under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) the 25 Oct. 1945 surrender ceremonies in Taipei only marked the beginning of the military occupation. There was no transfer of Taiwan's territorial sovereignty to China on that day.

In his Memorandum of 14 December 1949, he carefully explained that the position of Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China military forces in Taiwan was not one of "ownership," but merely as "custodian." As custodian, of course these military personnel have certain obligations to the territory and to the people thereon.

We can find these obligations carefully delineated in the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, and customary international humanitarian law. And yet, in relation to Taiwan, beginning October 1945, the ROC regime violated the vast majority of these obligations. These are

Major Violations of International Law

Actions of the ROC regime	Are in Direct Violation of
Announcement of Taiwan Retrocession Day on 25 Oct. 1945	HR articles 42, 43; and GCIV article 47
Seizure, expropriation, & confiscation of property in Taiwan	HR articles 23(g), 28, 46, 47, 53, 55, 56; and GCIV articles 33, 53
Implementation of the mass naturalization of Taiwan people (Jan. 12, 1946)	HR article 45; and GCIV article 35
Promulgation of a new criminal code and legal structure (mid-1940s), new Constitution (Dec. 25, 1947), proclamation of martial law (May 19, 1949), and other major legal changes in the 1940s, 1950s, etc.	HR article 43; and GCIV articles 54, 64, 65
Holding trials of civilian personnel by military courts	HR articles 23(h), 43, 50; and GCIV articles 31, 32, 33, 51, 54, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 76
Establishment of a new court system, the promulgation of relevant rules and regulations for the operations of that court system, and the appointment of KMT-loyalist judges to serve therein	HR article 43; and GCIV articles 54, 64, 65, and the principle of judicial neutrality
Introduction of a new currency in mid-1949 and implementation of major currency devaluations	HR article 43, 48
Acceptance of mass immigration into Taiwan from China	GCIV 49
Failure to identify a category of "protected persons," while at the same time not allowing such persons to make contact with representatives of the protecting power(s)	GCIV articles 4, 9, 11, 12, 27, 29, 30, 31, 35, 47, 52, 74, 101
Partial implementation of military conscription policies in the late 1940s, and mandatory implementation for all Taiwan males by July 1951	HR article 45; and GCIV articles 35, 51

Terminology Note: the term "ROC regime" is held to include the ROC government and the "KMT political party" during the historical period when the KMT was the controlling and/or dominant political party in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan.

Afterword: It must be stressed that there is no broad doctrine in international law recognizing any right to the "restoration," "recovery," "retrocession," etc. of territory allegedly included within "national boundaries" in previous historical eras. Therefore, even though the military troops under CKS announced "Taiwan Retrocession Day" on 25 Oct. 1945, it is not surprising that neither the United States nor other leading nations recognized any transfer of Taiwan's territorial sovereignty to China at that time. In reality, the surrender ceremonies only marked the beginning of the military occupation.

International law states that military occupation does not transfer sovereignty.

Clearly, Japan held Taiwan's territorial sovereignty until its renunciation became effective on the date of 28 April 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) took force.

COMMENTS AFTER LATE APRIL 1952

Looking back at this December 1949 Memorandum from the vantage point of May 1952 and beyond, we can make further comments as follows:

In December 1949, General MacArthur provided the following important viewpoints.

If Formosa is threatened, it is the duty of the Allied to defend it.

COMMENTS: Here Gen. MacArthur explains the situation during the period of belligerent occupation, which covers the period of time from the surrender ceremonies up to the peace treaty. However, with the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) coming into force on 28 April 1952, the situation has changed, because the Allies have disbanded. Yet, what about the disposition of Taiwan? Reading through the treaty, many people are puzzled by the fact that Japan has renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan, but no "receiving country" has been designated.

Interim Arrangements: Significantly however, the specifications of SFPT Article 2(b) do not leave the administration of Taiwan in a vacuum, since the signatories have agreed to the United States of America serving in the role of the principal occupying power [See Article 23(a)], with United States Military Government (USMG) jurisdiction in force over both the Ryukyu island group and Taiwan [See Article 4(b)].

DEFINITION: The form of administration by which an occupying power exercises government authority over occupied territory is called "military government."

We could contend in the peace negotiations that conditions have so changed since the Yalta Agreement (February 4 - 11, 1945), that it would not be obligatory to give Formosa to the Nationalist Government of China . . . . .

COMMENTS: Here Gen. MacArthur clearly indicates that the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, cannot be interpreted to be specifying "final arrangements" for the disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, but only serves as a "statement of intention" which can be changed according to the developing world situation. Importantly, none of the Allies viewed the Cairo Declaration as a treaty. It was in fact similar to a press release. In the SFPT, although "final arrangements" for the disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores were not specified, but interim arrangements were made. (See above.)

However, placing U.S. Forces on Formosa is not favored.

COMMENTS: Here Gen. MacArthur gives his opinion on the situation in December 1949. However, with the SFPT coming into force on 28 April 1952, the situation has changed. The treaty has specified USMG jurisdiction being in force over both the Ryukyu island group and Taiwan. In consideration that the United States had a large contingent of military troops in the Ryukyus at this time, it would have been in full compliance with both United States and international norms for the US military to establish a major presence in Taiwan beginning late April 1952, and to begin exercising some degree of administration over the island. The first step would probably be the appointment of a US-nationality High Commissioner.

	(Signed)	Tracy S. Voorhees


		TRACY S. VOORHEES
		Under Secretary of the Army