Treaty of Taipei, Article 3


Treaty of Taipei Article 3 provides that the disposition of the property and claims of each nation and its nationals against the other nation or its nationals "shall be the subject of special arrangements between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of Japan."

Q1: Is there any chance that these "special arrangements" have anything to do with the disposition of Taiwan territory itself?

A1: With reference to the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) in accompaniment with basic legal principles of treaty interpretation, it is highly unlikely that the "special arrangements" mentioned in Article 3 of the Treaty of Taipei have anything to do with the disposition of Taiwan territory.

Detailed analysis is given as follows:

  1. Scope of SFPT Article 26: This article ensures that any bilateral treaties Japan signs with non-SFPT signatories must be on "the same or substantially the same terms" as the SFPT. It also prevents Japan from granting greater advantages to any state than those provided in the SFPT.
  2. Content of Treaty of Taipei Article 3: This article specifically deals with property rights, claims, and debts between Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. It does not mention territorial disposition.
  3. Limitations imposed by SFPT Article 26: The Treaty of Taipei, being a bilateral treaty under the framework of SFPT Article 26, cannot grant greater advantages or differ substantially from the terms of the SFPT.
  4. SFPT's handling of Taiwan's status: The SFPT intentionally left Taiwan's territorial status ambiguous, not specifying to whom sovereignty was transferred when Japan renounced it.
  5. Scope of "special arrangements": The context clearly indicates that these arrangements are about property and financial claims, not territorial sovereignty.
  6. Legal principle of treaty interpretation: Treaties are generally interpreted based on the ordinary meaning of their terms in their context. The context here is clearly economic, not territorial.
  7. Consistency with international law: Territorial changes typically require explicit language in treaties. The vague "special arrangements" clause would not be sufficient for territorial disposition under international law.
  8. Historical context: The focus on property and claims reflects the need to resolve wartime and post-war economic issues, not to determine territorial sovereignty.

Given these factors, it is extremely improbable that the "special arrangements" mentioned in Article 3 of the Treaty of Taipei could be interpreted as relating to the disposition of Taiwan territory. Such an interpretation would likely violate the constraints set by SFPT Article 26 and would be inconsistent with established principles of international law regarding territorial changes.

The "special arrangements" are almost certainly limited to the economic and property issues explicitly mentioned in the article, and do not extend to matters of territorial sovereignty.



Q2: But, isn't it true that territory is a form of property?

A2: Indeed, this is an intriguing point that requires careful consideration. While territory and property can be related concepts, especially in historical contexts, they are generally treated differently in modern international law.

This may be explored as follows:

  1. Distinction in International Law: In contemporary international law, state territory is generally not considered a form of property that can be easily transferred or disposed of like private property. Territorial sovereignty is a fundamental aspect of statehood and is governed by specific principles of international law.
  2. Historical Context: Historically, there were instances where territory was treated more like property (e.g., in colonial era transactions). However, by the mid-20th century, this view was largely obsolete in international relations and law.
  3. Self-Determination Principle: Modern international law emphasizes the principle of self-determination, which conflicts with the idea of territory as transferable property.
  4. Specificity in Treaties: When treaties deal with territorial changes, they typically use explicit language. The vague "special arrangements" clause is not consistent with how territorial transfers are usually handled in international agreements.
  5. SFPT's Intentional Ambiguity: The San Francisco Peace Treaty deliberately left Taiwan's final status ambiguous. Interpreting the Treaty of Taipei’s "special arrangements" clause to include territorial disposition would contradict this intentional ambiguity.
  6. Scope of Article 3: The article specifically mentions "property," "claims," and "debts," which in context appear to refer to private and state-owned assets, not sovereign territory.
  7. Limitations of Bilateral Agreements: Given SFPT Article 26, the bilateral Treaty of Taipei cannot substantially deviate from or exceed the terms of the SFPT, which did not resolve Taiwan's territorial status.   Note: Many people view the Treaty of Taipei as a supplementary treaty to the SFPT, when in fact it is a subsidiary treaty. Its interpretation is therefore subject to relevant limitations.
  8. Legal Authority Limitations: Japan, having already renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan in the SFPT without specifying a recipient, lacked the legal authority to make any territorial dispositions regarding Taiwan in a subsequent bilateral treaty with the ROC. This principle of nemo dat quod non habet ("no one can give what they don't have") is fundamental in international law.

The point that territory can be seen as a form of property is thought-provoking and has some historical precedent, however in the context of post-World War II international law and the specific treaties in question, it's highly unlikely that the "special arrangements" clause was intended to or could legally encompass the disposition of Taiwan's territorial status.

The ambiguity in Taiwan's status stemming from the SFPT was likely intentional, and interpreting the "special arrangements" clause in the Treaty of Taipei to include territorial disposition would be inconsistent with this intentional ambiguity and the principles of international law prevailing at the time.





Treaty of Taipei, Article 3

The disposition of property of Japan and its nationals in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores), and their claims, including debts, against the authorities of the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and the residents thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents and their claims, including debts, against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of Japan. The terms nationals and residents include juridical persons.




SFPT, Article 26

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.









[English version]   https://www.twdefense.info/trust3/tt-Art3.htm